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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
---0000000---
INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH 
AMERICA, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
LANSEAIR TRAVEL AGENCY, INC., 
PREBEN H. NIELSEN, et al, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
---0000000---
NATURE OF CASE 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 16604 
Plaintiff-respondent Insurance company of North 
America (hereinafter "INA") commenced this action in the 
Third District Court of Salt Lake County, seeking to enforce 
an indemnity agreement that defendant-appellant Preben H. 
Nielsen (hereinafter "defendant Nielsen") executed person-
ally as well as on behalf of his corporation, Lanseair 
Travel Agency, Inc., (hereinafter "Lanseair"). 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This matter was tried before the Honorable James 
S. Sawaya on January 25 and 26, 1979. Defendant Lanseair 
Travel Agency, Inc., filed no answer and made no appearance 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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and its default was entered. (R. at 195.) An order of 
dismissal was entered as to defendant Rulon DeYoung on 
February 6, 1979 (R. at 355-56); thereafter, Judge Sawaya 
entered judgment against Lanseair and defendant Nielsen on 
March 19, 1979. (R. at 397-98.) Defendant Nielsen's 
Motion (R. at 399-407) to Alter or Amend the Judgment was 
denied on July 23, 1979. (R. at 412-13.) The dismissal of 
Rulon DeYoung and the Judgment against Lanseair have not 
been appealed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
INA respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
the Judgment entered against defendant Nielsen and, on the 
basis of its cross-appeal (R. at 422-23), order an addi-
tional award of attorney's fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant Nielsen made application to INA for the 
inclusion of his Lanseair Travel Agency, Inc., on a Schedule 
Bond by which INA bonded numerous other travel agencies. 
(Tr. at 6; R. at 577.) The issuance of such a bond was a 
necessary prerequisite for Lanseair to gain appointment as 3 
travel agent by the Air Traffic Conference of America 
(hereinafter "the ATC"). (Tr. at 144; R. at 715.) The ATC 
is an airline industry association that acts as a clearing 
house for airline passenger tickets on behalf of travel 
agencies and the various airlines. (Id.) 
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In order to induce INA to bond Lanseair, which was 
a new and unproven corporation lacking any experience in the 
travel agency business, both Lanseair and defendant Nielsen 
(who was its majority stockholder, president, and secretary 
and also a member of its board of directors) executed an 
indemnity agreement. (Tr. at 4; R. at 575.) By this agree-
ment, Lanseair and defendant Nielsen agreed faithfully to 
perform all of their obligations to the ATC and to indemnify 
INA from any loss, costs, attorney's fees, or other expenses 
which INA might sustain as a result of having included 
Lanseair on its Schedule Bond "or any continuation thereof." 
The personal indemnity agreement also provided that INA 
should 
have the exclusive right to adjust, settle, 
or compromise any claim under this obli-
gation, and any voucher or other evidence 
of any loss costs and expenses paid in 
good faith by the surety shall be prima 
facie evidence of the fact and extent of 
the liability of [defendant Nielsen] 
Based upon defendant Nielsen's application on 
behalf of Lanseair and his personal indemnity agreement, 
INA bonded Lanseair under its Schedule Bond. (Tr. at 150-
52; R. at 721-23.) As a result, Lanseair was enabled to 
enter into a sales agency agreement with the ATC. (Exhibit 
8-P.) This sales agency agreement, which remained in force 
through September, 1974, permitted Lanseair to operate as a 
travel agency and to sell and issue tickets on behalf of the 
-3-
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various airlines. Under the terms of the agreement, Lanseair 
was obligated to remit to ATC on the 10th, 20th, and last 
day of each month the net value of all airline tickets 
issued during that reporting period, less its commissions. 
(Tr. at 112; R. at 683.) 
The checks (Exhibits 10-P and 11-P) issued to the 
ATC for the first two reporting periods in September, 1974, 
were dishonored by Lanseair's bank. (Tr. at 158-59; R. at 
729-30.) Thereafter, Lanseair did not attempt to make 
further remittances to the ATC. (Tr. at 2 3 4 ; R. at 8 0 5.) 
The dishonor of these checks and Lanseair's failure to remit 
thereafter constituted defaults under its sales agency 
agreement. (R. at 389.) The ATC was protected from such 
default, to the extent of $10,000, by INA's bond. 
383-84 and 388.) 
(R. at 
Both INA and the ATC notified defendant Nielsen of 
Lanseair's defaults. (Exhibits 2-P and 3-P; also Tr. at 
160.) INA also advised him that it would seek reimbursement 
under his personal indemnity agreement. (Exhibit 2-P.) 
Defendant Nielsen responded only with the assertion that a 
letter he claimed to have written to the ATC on August 23, 
1974, shielded him from all possible liability; he made no 
effort to cure or minimize Lanseair' s default. (Exhibits 2-P 
and 3-P.) 
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Lanseair had issued on behalf of seven airlines a 
total of some $15,000 worth of domestic airline passenger 
tickets for which it made no remittance to the ATC. (Tr. at 
183; R. at 754.) In accordance with the usual industry 
practices, the various airlines submitted to the ATC documen-
tation of the passenger tickets with respect to which Lanseair 
had defaulted. (Exhibit 37-P and Tr. at 167.) Based upon 
this documentation, the ATC filed a claim against INA under 
the provisions of the Schedule Bond. (Exhibit 28-P and Tr. 
at 168-70.) On January 22, 1975, INA paid $10,000 to the 
ATC, which amount represented its full bond limit with 
respect to Lanseair. (Exhibit 32-P and Tr. at 173-74.) 
This $10,000 payment was subsequently disbursed on a pro 
rata basis to the various airlines that had sustained a loss 
on account of Lanseair's default. (Tr. at 175-177; R. at 
746-48.) 
By this action, INA seeks to recover this loss, 
its expenses and attorney's fees from defendant Nielsen on 
the basis of his personal indemnity agreement. 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE ANY 
REVERS IBLE ERROR. 
Even though he made no effort to secure their 
presence, defendant Nielsen complains vociferously that no 
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employees of INA were present at the trial and protests that 
the trial judge did not view the facts and testimony in a 
light favorable to him. While defendant Nielsen's dis-
enchantment with the outcome of the trial is understandable, 
his complaints do not constitute grounds for reversal. 
A. Upon Introduction of the Indemnity Agreement and the 
Canceled Check by Which Payment Under the Bond Was Made, 
Plaintiff INA Established a Prima Facie Case. 
Both commercial and informal sureties commonly 
require that the principal whose performance they are about 
to guarantee agree to indemnify them in the event that they 
are called upon to cure a default. Such agreements not on~ 
afford the surety a measure of protection in the event of a 
default, they also discourage needless default. These 
indemnity agreements commonly contain either a "conclusive 
evidence" or a "prima facie evidence" clause. The present 
indemnity agreement contains the latter type, the so-called 
"prima facie evidence" clause. The admitted purpose of such 
clauses is to relieve the surety from the enormous task of 
having to prove every element of its principal's default and 
the obligee's loss in order to recover from an indemnitor. 
Although there is some split of authority among 
the jurisdictions as to whether "conclusive evidence" 
clauses are enforceable, the overwhelming majority of 
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jurisdictions, if not all, routinely enforce "prima facie 
evidence" clauses. Corpus Juris Secundum reports that: 
[A] "conclusive evidence" clause of an 
indemnity contract, that a voucher show-
ing payment shall be conclusive evidence 
of the liability, has been held void, 
although the contrary has also been held; 
and such a clause also has been sustained 
if containing or permitting an exception 
in the case of fraud. 
A clause that in case of the payment 
of a compromise sum by a surety company in 
settlement, an itemized statement thereof, 
verified by the company officers, shall be 
prima facie evidence of the fact and extent 
of the indemnitor's liability has been 
sustained. 
17 C.J.S. Contracts, §229(5) (footnotes omitted, emphasis 
added) . The indemnity agreement presently before this Court 
contains the provision that "any voucher or other evidence 
of any loss, costs and expenses paid in good faith by the 
Surety shall be prima facie evidence of the fact and extent 
of the liability" of defendant Nielsen. (Exhibit 1-P.) 
This Court noted without comment or concern the 
existence of a similar "prima facie evidence" clause in the 
indemnity agreement at issue in Hartford Accident and 
Indemnity Company v. Clegg, 103 Utah 414, 135 P.2d 919 
(1943). Therefore, while this Court has never expressly 
ruled upon the precise issue, it is apparent that Utah 
follows the universally accepted proposition that "prima 
facie evidence" clauses are enforceable. 
-7-
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In Standard Accident Insurance Company v. Fell, 
2 So.2d 519 (La. 1941), a personal indemnitor challenged t~ 
enforceability of a conclusive evidence clause by which he 
had agreed "that the vouchers . showing payment by the 
company of any claim . shall be conclusive evidence of 
the fact and amount of liability . provided that such 
payment shall have been made by the company in good faith. 
2 So.2d at 524. At the trial, the bonding company 
placed in evidence the application that contained the 
indemnity agreement and its canceled check that had been 
issued in payment to the obligee. 2 So.2d at 522. On 
appeal, the personal indemnitor argued that a sufficient 
case against him had not been established since the bonding 
company had not proven that the obligee had in fact sustain~ 
a loss on account of the principal's default. The appella~ 
court rejected this contention, noting its approval of the 
proposition that: 
Such stipulations as the one under 
consideration should be held to be con-
clusive upon the "risk" [i.e., the 
principal] in an action brought against 
him by the insurer to recover indemnity 
for any moneys paid by it to the insured 
in settlement of a loss coming within the 
terms of a policy of guaranty insurance, 
in the absence of fraud or collusion 
between the insurer and the insured. It 
is unconscionable, in our opinion, tha~ 
the insurer, after settling in good faith 
a loss under the policy with the insured, 
should be compelled to bear the burden of 
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protracted litigation with the "risk", in 
order to recover reimbursement for moneys 
so expended for the use and benefit of 
such "risk". 
2 so.2d at 525 (citations omitted, emphasis added). Likewise, 
it would have been unreasonable and impractical for the 
trial court to have insisted that, having bonded Lanseair in 
reliance upon defendant Nielsen's personal indemnity agree-
ment and having made good Lanseair's default in its obliga-
tions to the ATC, INA formally prove each and every element 
of Lanseair's default. It would have been particularly 
unreasonable for the trial court to have required such 
formal proof from INA in view of the fact that defendant 
Nielsen presented no evidence whatsoever of any bad faith on 
the part of INA and, moreover, did not even raise that issue 
in his pleadings. 
In Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York v. 
Harrison, 274 S.W. 1002 (Texas 1925), a "conclusive evidence" 
clause was held to be enforceable notwithstanding that the 
personal indemnitor had proven to the satisfaction of a jury 
that the obligee in fact had not been entitled to payment 
from the surety. The personal indemnitor had purchased 
"traveler's checks" from the American Express Company. Some 
of these checks had been lost and, in seeking replacements, 
he had been required to provide a bond to guarantee his 
statement that he had not voluntarily disposed of the 
-9-
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checks. The bonding company in turn required that he 
execute an indemnity agreement that contained a provision 
that any "voucher or other evidence of payment" by the 
bonding company would constitute conclusive evidence of the 
loss. The missing checks were later negotiated with forg~ 
signatures and, when they were eventually received by 
American Express, a claim was made against the bonding 
company, which paid the value of the checks. Thereafter, 
the bonding company sought to recover this loss from the 
personal indemnitor on the basis of the conclusive evidence 
clause. The trial court refused to enforce the clause 
because the jury found that the signatures on the negotiated 
checks were forgeries and that American Express should not 
have made payment. On appeal, however, it was held that 
this question was beyond the scope of the appropriate 
inquiry since the bonding company had proven that it had 
paid American Express and the personal indemni tor had agreed 
that such proof would constitute conclusive evidence of his 
liability to the bonding company. In so holding, the cour~ 
indicated its approval of the proposition that: 
The expense, delay, trouble, and risk of 
loss to the guarantee company is a suffi-
cient safeguard against an unwarranted 
payment; and, without such a stipulation 
as complained of here, guarantee companies 
could not safely do business anything like 
as cheaply as they do, and to the evident 
-10-
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advantage of the parties and of the general 
public. 
274 S.W. at 1004-05. If a conclusive evidence clause such 
as was at issue in Harrison is enforceable, then, ~ fortiori 
a mere prima facie evidence clause such as that agreed to by 
defendant Nielsen in this action must be fully enforceable. 
Such clauses were also enforced in Carroll v. National 
Surety Company, 24 F.2d 268 (D.C. Cir. 1928), and in Lander 
v. Phoenix Indemnity Company, 329 S.W.2d 951 (Texas 1959). 
In this case, defendant Nielsen's indemnity 
agreement (Exhibit 1-P) was admitted without objection. 
(Tr. at 6; R. at 577.) Additionally, the canceled check by 
which INA made payment to the ATC on account of Lanseair's 
default was admitted in evidence as Exhibit 32-P. Defendant 
Nielsen's only objection to this exhibit was that it was 
hearsay: 
MR. DART: We offer Exhibits 29 and 
32, Your Honor. 
MR. GARRETT: My objection, of course, 
Your Honor, is based upon the fact 
the check is issued on hearsay 
piled on hearsay. 
Transcript at 174 (R. at 745). The check, of course, is not 
hearsay: it was not admitted to prove the truth of anything 
stated in it, rather it was admitted for the purpose of 
proving that INA in fact paid the sum of $10,000 to the ATC. 
Accordingly, the only objection raised to the admission of 
-11-
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this exhibit was totally without merit. 
Considering only Exhibits 1-P and 32-P, INA 
established a prima facie case. From that point on, it was 
incumbent upon defendant Nielsen to introduce sufficient 
testimony or evidence to prove the invalidity of INA' s prima 
facie case. As will be demonstrated infra, not only did 
defendant Nielsen fail to prove any defense to INA's case, 
INA went much further and actually proved Lanseair 's default 
through direct evidence. 
B. The Trial Court's Findings of Fact Are Presumed Valid 
and Will Not Be Disturbed If Based upon Any Substantial 
Evidence. 
In this action, INA seeks only to enforce defendant 
Nielsen's written contract through the recovery of money 
damages; therefore, this is an action at law rather than in 
equity. The Findings of Fact made by the trial court are tc 
be indulged with a presumption of validity and will not be 
disturbed by this Court on appeal if there is any substan-
tial evidence in the Record to support them. Town and 
Country Disposal, Inc. v. Martin, 563 P.2d 195 (Utah 1977) 
(" [T]he findings and judgment of the trial court should oot 
be upset on appeal if there exists any substantial evidence 
in the record supportive of the lower court's conclusions."!· 
R. C. Tolman Construction Company, Inc., v. Myton Water 
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Association, 563 P.2d 780 (Utah 1977); Dockstader v. Walker, 
29 Utah 2d 370, 510 P.2d 526 (1973) ("[I]t is our duty to 
sustain the ruling of the trial court where there is competent 
evidence to sustain it."); Nance v. City of Provo, 29 Utah 
2d 340, 509 P.2d 365 (1973) ("It is our duty on appeal to 
affirm the trial court in its findings of fact where there 
is competent evidence to support those findings."). 
This Court has frequently reiterated that the 
trial court's Findings of Fact are presumed vaild, and held 
that those findings are to be disturbed only when there is 
no evidence to support them. For example, in Bramel v. 
Utah State Road Commission, 24 Utah 2d 50, 465 P.2d 534 
(1970) this Court held that the fundamental rule of appel-
late procedure was that: 
[I]t is the trial judge's prerogative to 
find the facts; and this includes judging 
the credibility of the witnesses and the 
evidence, and drawing whatever reasonable 
inferences may fairly be derived therefrom. 
It is therefore . . . accurate to say that 
on review we survey the evidence in the 
light favorable to the findings, whichever 
party they may favor; and that they will 
not be disburbed on appeal if they are 
supported by substantial evidence. 
465 P.2d at 535-36 (footnote omitted). 
In his challenge to the Findings, defendant Nielsen 
charges that they "are contrary to the manifest weight of 
the evidence." (Br. App. at 11.) This is not only a mis-
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statement of the applicable standard, it is also a tacit 
admission that there is evidence in the Record that supporb 
the Findings. This Court's observation in Cannon v. WrigM, 
531 P.2d 1290 (Utah 1975), is directly applicable to defen~m 
Nielsen's contention: 
[The appellant) misconceives and misstates 
his duty on appeal in attempting to upset 
the findings and judgment. His brief states 
that the trial court erred in making the 
above stated findings against "the clear 
weight of the evidence." This is not an 
equity case, but a law case, wherein any 
substantial evidence will support the 
findings and judgment. 
531 P.2d at 1292 (footnote omitted, emphasis added). 
Accordingly, so long as there is some substantial evidence 
in the Record to support the trial court's Findings, this 
Court will not disturb those findings. 
C. Defendant Nielsen Has Utterly Failed to Demonstrate ~rt 
His Personal Indemnity Agreement Was Revoked Prior to 
Lanseair's Default. 
Defendant Nielsen's entire contention that his 
personal indemnity agreement was revoked prior to the 
default of Lanseair is predicated upon a letter that he 
alleges he wrote and mailed to the ATC on August 23, 1974. 
Defendant Nielsen's "yellow copy" of this alleged letter w~ 
admitted as Exhibit 46-D. 
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(1) The Alleged Letter Was Never Received. 
The only evidence of the preparation or mailing of this 
letter was that given by defendant Nielsen himself. (Tr. at 
77-78; R. at 648-49.) On the other hand, Mrs. Darlene Dolan, 
an employee of the ATC, testified that she had with her all 
of the ATC's files relating to Lanseair; that she had searched 
those files for the original or any copy of this letter; and 
that she had been unable to find either the letter or any 
evidence that it had ever been received. (Tr. at 186-80; R. 
at 757-60.) Mrs. Dolan also testified that, had such a 
letter been received, a change-of-ownership procedure would 
have been commenced by the ATC. (Tr. at 189-90; R. at 760-
61.) It was her testimony, however, that no such procedure 
was in fact commenced. (Id.) Moreover, while defendant 
Nielsen testified that the alleged letter had been mailed to 
the ATC at 1000 Connecticut Avenue in the District of 
Columbia, Mrs. Dolan's uncontradicted testimony was that the 
ATC had moved to another address some two years before the 
date of the alleged letter and mail was no longer forwarded. 
(Tr. 206-07; R. at 777-78.) 
Based upon this testimony, the trial court concluded 
that defendant Nielsen had failed to prove that the alleged 
letter of August 23, 1974, had ever been received by the 
ATC. (R. at 384-85 and 388-89.) The trial court's Findings 
and Conclusions with respect to the alleged letter are 
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entirely correct. Although a presumption does arise that a 
letter was delivered from testimony that it was mailed, this 
presumption is dependent upon the letter being correctly 
addressed and is completely rebutted by evidence that it ws 
not received. American Jursiprudence reports the rule as 
being that: 
Where proof is given that a letter 
has been duly mailed, a presumption of 
the receipt of the letter by the sendee 
arises. On the other hand, proof of the 
failure of a letter to arive at its 
destination raises a presumption that 
it was never mailed. 
29 AmJur 2d Evidence, §193 at 246. The presumption of 
receipt, however, is totally dependent upon the letter bei~ 
properly addressed: 
A correct address is one of the essen-
tial elements on which the presumption of 
the receipt of a letter from evidence of 
its proper mailing is founded; as a general 
rule, a failure to show that the letter was 
correctly addressed will deprive the sender 
of the benefit of such presumption. 
There is no presumption that the addressee 
of a letter received it from the fact that 
it was not returned to the sender, if it 
was not directed to the place at which the 
addressee resided at the time. 
29 AmJur 2d Evidence, §196 at 249-50. 
This principle has been accepted by this court. 
For example, in Campbell v. Gowans, 35 Utah 268, 100 Pac. 
397 (1909), a witness testified that he wrote and mailed a 
letter containing directions material to the suit. As in 
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this case, there was also testimony that the letter had not 
been received by the addressee. This Court held: 
The mailing of a letter postpaid and 
properly addressed to a person shown 
to reside in a city or town to which 
the letter was addressed creates no 
legal presumption, but a presumption 
or inference of fact, that it reached 
its destination. . . The testimony 
of the witness ... is therefore some 
evidence that the letter testified to 
by him was received . . in the due 
course of mail. The defendants, however, 
testified that no such letter as testi-
fied to . . was received by them. 
On such question we think the evidence 
preponderates in favor of the defendants 
100 Pac. at 403 (citation omitted, emphasis added). Likewise, 
in this case, the trial court's Finding that the alleged 
letter was never received is well supported by the Record. 
Moreover, even if defendant Nielsen had proven 
that his alleged letter of August 23, 1974, had actually 
been delivered to the ATC, there are at least three further 
conclusive reasons why that letter could not serve as a 
valid defense. A finding in favor of INA on any one of 
these would be sufficient to affirm the judgment. 
(2) The ATC Was Not INA's Agent. The alleged 
letter upon which defendant Nielsen relies so heavily was 
directed to the ATC, not to INA. The trial court found that 
since the ATC was not INA's agent, notice to the ATC would 
have been insufficient to terminate defendant Nielsen's 
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obligations to INA. (R. at 390.) 
In an effort to demonstrate that the ATC was 
somehow INA's agent in connection with the Lanseair bond, 
defendant Nielsen relies upon two theories. Neither has any 
merit. The first is that the bond application (Exhibit l~) 
stated that it was to be given by the travel agent to the 
ATC. In support of this theory, defendant Nielsen relies 
solely upon the following title which appears on the rever~ 
side of the application form: 
Application for bond given by travel agent 
to Air Traffic Conference, Washington, D. C. 
Even a casual consideration of the language will reveal that 
the phrase "given by travel agent to Air Traffic Conference" 
indicates to whom the bond is to be given, not to whom the 
application for the bond is to be given. The trial court sc 
found. (R. at 382.) 
The second prong of defendant Nielsen's contentioo 
is that the application containing the personal indemnity 
agreement (Exhibit 1-P) was provided to him by the ATC. 
(See, e.g., Br. App. at 4.) As manager of the ATC' s Finan-
cial Affairs Division it was Mrs. Darlene Dolan's respon-
sibility to verify that travel agents were bonded and handle 
the claims in the event of defaults. It was her uncontradic: 
testimony that the ATC received bonds from many sureties 
(Tr. at 150; R. at 721) and that the ATC never provided 
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prospective travel agents with bond applications (Tr. at 
185-86; R. at 756-57). Moreover, defendant Nielsen's 
repeated protestations (e.g., Tr. at 77; R. at 648) that he 
had never dealt with, nor even heard of, INA are conclu-
sively refuted by Exhibit 6-P, which contains a letter in 
which he states "we have applied to Insurance Company of 
North America for transfer present bond to our name." (Tr. 
at 83-84; R. at 654-55.) There is a great deal of sub-
stantial, credible evidence not only that the ATC was not 
INA's agent in connection with the Lanseair bond but also 
that defendant Nielsen knew precisely with whom he was 
dealing. 
Additionally, even if the ATC had acted as an 
intermediary in connection with defendant Nielsen's nego-
tiations with INA, the ATC would not thereby have become an 
agent of INA for the purpose of receiving notification of 
defendant Nielsen's desire to terminate his obligations as 
personal indemnitor. A case meeting the precise question 
whether the rights of a bonding company against its indemnitor 
can be prejudiced by the acts and knowledge of the obligee 
is Insurance Company of North America v. Brehm, 478 P.2d 387 
(Ore. 1970). In that case, the obligee actually provided 
the principal with an application to the bonding company, 
which issued a bond upon receipt of his indemnity agreement. 
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After sustaining a loss on the bond, the surety sought 
reimbursement from the indemni tor, who defended on the basis 
that recovery was barred by misrepresentations made by the 
obligee. The Oregon Supreme Court rejected all such claims, 
holding: 
Before learning of the alleged misrepre-
sentations, [the bonding company] in 
good faith had accepted liability to 
the bank relative to the transaction 
in question under its bond. This is, 
we think, a material change of position 
induced by [the indemnitors'] promise. 
As to [the bonding company], the trans-
action was no longer voidable. 
478 P.2d at 391. Accordingly, the trial court correctly 
rejected defendant Nielsen's contention that his alleged 
letter to the ATC could somehow relieve him of his contr~~L 
obligations to INA. 
(3) The Attempted Revocation Was Not 
Timely. Defendant Nielsen's alleged letter to the ATC cou~ 
not have relieved him of his obligations to INA even if it 
had been received because the Lanseair default occurred 
before the revocation could have become effective. Even 
assuming, arguendo, that defendant Nielsen's personal 
indemnity obligation to INA was revocable, it could be 
terminated only upon sufficient notice to allow INA to 
protect its interests. 
The practical and just proposition that one 
desiring to terminate an indemnity agreement must give 
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sufficient notice to permit the surety, in turn, to protect 
its interests has long been accepted. For example, such a 
rule was recognized and applied by the Idaho Supreme Court 
in American Surety Company v. Blake, 261 Pac. 239 (Idaho 
1927). After sustaining a loss on a bank's bond, the surety 
brought an action against the indemnitor, who then claimed 
to have sent notice to the surety that he was no longer 
associated with the bank and was revoking his indemnity 
agreement. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the indem-
nitor's liability would not be terminated immediately upon 
the receipt of such notice, but only upon the expiration of 
a period of time sufficient for the surety to take reason-
able steps to protect itself: 
It is true that the notice of the 
indemnitors to the surety company was 
sufficient to absolve them from further 
liability accruing after a reasonable 
time within which the surety could 
secure its own release, if it chose, 
by giving notice of withdrawal . 
261 Pac. at 241 (emphasis added). Accordingly, while a 
personal indemnitor may be able to terminate his undertaking 
upon notice, he must allow his surety a sufficient length of 
time to protect its interests. 
Contrary to defendant Nielsen's assertion in his 
Brief (Br. App. at 11), the requirement of reasonable notice 
was reaffirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court in the second 
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appeal in the Blake case: 
On the former appeal of this case to this 
court, it was definitely held that the 
indemnitors to the surety company could, 
by notice, absolve themselves from lia-
bility, after a reasonable time in which 
the surety could secure its own release 
from obligation to the state. 
American Surety Company of New York v. Blake, 27 P. 2d 972 at 
974 (Idaho 1933) (emphasis added). In this case, the bond 
under which Lanseair was included at defendant Nielsen's 
request required INA to give the ATC at least 30 days 
advance notice of its intention to terminate coverage as ~ 
Lanseair. (See, Point I (D) , infra.) Accordingly, defendant 
Nielsen would have to have given INA at least 30 days noti~ 
before his obligation as personal indemnitor could have ~~ 
terminated. Since the Lanseair default occurred within 30 
days of the date of the alleged letter, his obligation witl i 
respect to the Lanseair default would have been unaffected. ' 
(4) The Alleged Letter Is Not Sufficient. 
The alleged letter of August 23, 1974, could not have 
terminated defendant Nielsen's obligation to INA because it 
does not contain a plain statement that he is revoking his 
indemnity agreement. The alleged letter recites that 
defendant Nielsen and E. L. Hardy have sold their Lanseair 
stock to Rulon DeYoung, who will thereafter have control of 
the business and then states: 
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Please change your records accordingly, 
and also be notified that P. H. Nielsen and 
E. L. Hardy will assume no personal liability 
or responsibility in connection with the 
future business transactions of Lanseair 
Travel Agency, Inc., this also applies to 
any personal liability or guaranty with 
the ATC Bond. Please notify your bonding 
company of this change. 
Exhibit 46-D (emphasis added). The only request is that the 
ATC notify its "bonding company of this change." First, INA 
was Lanseair's bonding company, not the ATC's. Moreover, 
the letter only requests that the ATC notify INA of the 
change of ownership. It does not even request that INA be 
advised that defendant Nielsen wishes to revoke his personal 
indemnity agreement. 
This Court recently articulated the standards 
which notice must meet in order to terminate a guarantee 
agreement. Presumably, notice would also have to meet the 
same standards in order to terminate a contract of indemnity. In 
Wells Fargo Bank, N. A. v. Midwest Realty & Finance, Inc., 
544 P.2d 882 (Utah 1975), this Court held: 
By duly executing . . continuing 
guaranties, knowing that others . 
would rely and act thereon, defendant 
became bound thereby until the guar-
anties were properly revoked or termin-
ated. While this could be done by written 
notice, it is only fair and reasonable 
that the notice must be clear and 
unequivocal. 
544 P.2d at 884 (emphasis added). Applying this rule, this 
Court held that a letter stating that "we will withdraw the 
-23-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Continuing Guaranty" but also requesting that "the guaran~ 
be immediately reduced" to a given amount was not sufficient 
either to terminate or to reduce the guarantor's obligation, 
In this case, the alleged letter does not even request that 
INA be notified that defendant Nielsen wishes to revoke his 
personal indemnity agreement; rather, it merely asks that 
the ATC notify INA of the change of ownership. 
The facts of Insurance Company of North America v. 
Hoyt, 419 F.2d 1148 (7th Cir. 1969), parallel precisely the 
facts of the present case. In Hoyt, the majority stock-
holder in a travel agency executed a personal indemnity 
agreement with INA in consideration of its inclusion of his 
travel agency on a Schedule Bond guaranteeing the agency's 
remittances to the ATC. This agreement contained the 
precise language at issue here. Shortly after a purported 
sale of the personal indemnitor's stock, the travel agency 
defaulted. The ATC filed a sworn proof-of-loss with INA a~ 
INA paid its coverage limit. INA then sued the personal 
indemnitor, seeking reimbursement of its loss and expenses. 
The personal indemnitor in Hoyt defended INA's 
action on the basis that he had placed a telephone call to 
an INA executive informing him that he wished to be relieved 
of his indemnity obligation. Characterizing this commu-
nication of a mere expression of the indemnitor's desires, 
the court rejected the claim that the indemni tor's obligatlC' 
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had been terminated: 
[W]e hold as a matter of law that there 
was no cancellation of [the indemnitor's] 
liability as indemnitor of [INA's] surety 
obligation before default. The question 
is not whether [the personal indemnitor] 
"wanted" to cancel his indemnity obligation, 
but rather whether what he actually did had 
the effect of cancellation. 
419 F.2d at 1151 (emphasis added). Defendant Nielsen's 
alleged communication to the ATC--not even to INA--expressing 
his desire that his indemnity obligation be canceled is, 
therfore, not sufficient to relieve him of liability under 
his express promise to indemnify INA. 
D. Lanseair's Default Occurred While the ATC Was Entitled 
to Protection under the Bond, 
It is defendant Nielsen's secondary contention in 
this appeal that INA's payment to the ATC on account of the 
Lanseair default was gratituous and, therefore, he has no 
obligation under his personal indemnity agreement. The 
trial court ruled against defendant Nielsen on this point, 
finding that the Schedule Bond remained in effect, as to 
Lanseair, through October 10, 1974, (R. at 384 and 388) but 
that the defaults occurred in September, 1974 (R. at 386 and 
389). These Findings are supported by substantial evidence 
and defendant Nielsen has failed to demonstrate any error. 
The bond under which Lanseair was included provided, 
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in pertinent part, that: 
If Surety shall so elect, liability 
assumed with respect to any named Travel 
Agent may be canceled by giving 30 days 
written notice, sent by regular mail, to 
the last known address of Obligee and 
Travel Agent(s). The Surety, however, 
will remain liable for any default 
occuring during the period up to the 
expiration of said 30 days notice. 
Exhibit 15-P at ~14 (emphasis added). Accordingly, INA could 
terminate its obligation under the Schedule Bond only by 
giving 30 days notice. Defendant Nielsen acknowledges in 
his Brief that the annual premium due September 1, 1974, was 
never paid. (Br. App. at 13.) Within ten days after 
Lanseair's premium payment became delinquent, INA acted to 
protect not only its interests but also those of defendant 
Nielsen by giving the required 30 days notice both to the 
ATC and to Lanseair that the inclusion of Lanseair would be 
terminated effective October 10, 1974. (Exhibits 9-P and 
20-P.) It was the testimony of Mrs. Darlene Dolan that, in 
this respect, INA acted in its usual manner. (Tr. at 193; 
R. at 764.) Accordingly, the trial court's Finding that 
INA's bond obligation to the ATC remained in force with 
respect to Lanseair through the date of the loss is sup-
ported by substantial evidence. 
The personal indemnity agreement that de~endant 
Nielsen executed expressly provides that it covers losses 
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under the "Schedule Bond, or any continuation thereof or any 
successory obligation in the same or a different amount . . 
(Exhibit 1-P). This precise language was construed by 
the court in Insurance Company of North America v. Hoyt, 
supra. In that case, the travel agency first applied for 
inclusion under INA's Schedule Bond for the calendar year 
1963. As in this case, both the corporate travel agency and 
the personal indemnitor were required to execute indemnity 
agreements. The travel agency again applied for inclusion 
under the Schedule Bond for the year 1964 and the personal 
indemnitor was again requested to sign an indemnity agree-
ment. In 1965, the travel agency paid the annual premium, 
but the personal indemnitor was not asked to sign a separate 
indemnity agreement. The travel agency defaulted during 
1965, and INA was compelled to make payment to the ATC under 
its bond. Thereafter, INA sought reimbursement from the 
personal indemnitor, who defended on the basis that his 
personal indemnity agreement, which had been executed in 
1964, had expired. The court rejected this contention, 
holding: 
We think the agreements plainly bind 
both [the travel agency and the personal 
indemnitor] to continue as indemnitors 
as long as [the agency] was "included 
. in the aforesaid Schedule Bond, or 
any continuation thereof." [The agency] 
paid the premium for 1965 and was included 
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in the Schedule Bond. [The personal 
indemnitor's) indemnity obligation accord-
ingly remained . 
There is no merit therefore in the 
argument that the personal indemnity had 
expired by its own terms before the June 
1965 loss. The indemnity obligation had 
no definite term of duration. The agree-
ments ran from year to year upon approved 
application or, after 1964, upon payment 
of premium. [The travel agency] paid the 
premium for the bond coverage for the full 
year of 1965 and thus the agreements were 
in effect during that year. . The 
evidence here is plain that the indemnity 
was continuous, but its duration was 
terminated by the failure to pay in advance 
annually the premium required. 
419 F.2d at 1150-51. By the same reasoning, defendant 
Nielsen's obligation to INA continued in this case until I~ 
had been able to relieve itself of its obligations to the 
ATC by giving the required 30-day notice. Defendant Nielsen 
relies upon the last sentence quoted above, claiming that it 
means that his obligations ceased immediately upon the 
failure of Lanseair to pay its premium. The rationale 
behind the court's opinion, however, makes clear that the 
personal indemnitor's obligations were to be concurrent witl 
and to continue so long as INA's obligations to the ATC. 
When Lanseair failed to pay its annual premium, 
INA immediately gave the ATC the required 30-day notice. 
The default of Lanseair occurred within that 30-day period; 
therefore, the default was covered under the bond. Defen-
dant Nielsen's obligations to INA continued until INA had 
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successfully relieved itself of its obligations to the ATC. 
The trial court's ruling so finding is supported by the 
uncontradicted evidence. 
E. The Trial Court's Evidentiary Rulings Are Correct, but 
Any Technical Errors Are Harmless in Any Event. Defendant 
Nielsen challenges the trial court's decision to receive in 
evidence a number of exhibits unfavorable to him. None of 
these challenges is valid. 
(1) The Schedule Bond. The Schedule Bond 
(Exhibit 15-P) was admitted by the trial court over defen-
dant Nielsen's objection. A review of the Transcript will 
reveal, however, that the only objection to the admission of 
this bond was that it was hearsay: 
MR. GARRETT: If Your Honor please, we 
object to Exhibit 15 on the grounds 
that there is no proper foundation 
showing that Lanseair Travel had any 
knowledge of the contents of this 
bond. It's hearsay as far as they 
are concerned. 
Transcript at 152-53 (R. at 723-24). The objection that the 
bond was hearsay is without merit because the bond was admitted 
not for the purpose of proving the truth of any statement 
contained in it, but rather for the purpose of establishing 
its terms and provisions and the conditions of INA's obliga-
tion to the ATC. Any objection that the copy of the bond 
actually received as Exhibit 15-P was not the best evidence 
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of the provisions of the Schedule Bond was waived since, as 
reported by American Jurisprudence, the rule is that on 
appeal a party will be limited 
to the specific objections to evidence 
made at the trial, and the appellate 
court will consider only such grounds of 
objection as are specified. In other 
words, a party is confined to the spe-
cific objections made by him and can 
have the benefit of no others. 
75 ArnJur 2d Trial, §167 at 255. See also, State v. Kelbach, 
23 Utah 2d 231, 461 P.2d 297 (1969); State v. Valdez, 
19 Utah 2d 426, 432 P.2d 53 (1967); Porcupine Reservoir 
Company v. Lloyd W. Keller Corporation, 15 Utah 2d 318, 392 
P. 2d 620 ( 1964); Pettingill v. Perkins, 2 Utah 2d 266, 272 
P.2d 185 (1954). 
Moreover, even if viewed as hearsay, the exhibit 
was clearly admissible under the business records exception. 
The trial court's admission of the exhibit was entirely 
proper. 
(2) The Documents Received by the ATC. 
Defendant Nielsen also complains (Br. App. at 19-20) that 
the trial court admitted exhibits and permitted testimony o' 
loss substantiation submitted to the ATC by the airlines. 
Mrs. Darlene Dolan evaluated these claims and relied upon 
them in preparing the proof-of-loss submitted to HJII.. (Tr. 
at 167-68; R. at 738-39.) For example, Exhibit 37-P is a 
compilation of the claims in regard to the Lanseair defaui: 
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(complete with supporting photostatic copies of passenger 
tickets and debit memos) submitted by the airlines to the 
ATC; Exhibit 36-P is a CPA's verification of the airlines' 
claims which was received by Mrs. Dolan as an attachment to 
INA's request (Exhibit 27-P) that a formal proof-of-loss be 
prepared and submitted; and Exhibit 28-P is the formal 
proof-of-loss sworn to by ~rs. Dolan on behalf of the ATC 
and submitted to INA. 
At trial, defendant Nielsen objected to the 
admission of these exhibits as hearsay. The court admitted 
the exhibits on the basis that even if hearsay they were 
admissible under the so-called business records exception to 
Rule 63 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, which provides: 
Evidence of a statement which is 
made other than by a witness while 
testifying at the hearing offered to 
prove the truth of the matter stated 
is hearsay evidence and inadmissible 
except: 
(13) Business entries and the 
like. Writings offered as memoranda 
or records of acts, conditions or 
events to prove the facts stated 
therein, if the judge finds that they 
were made in the regular course of a 
business at or about the time of the 
act, condition or event recorded, and 
that the sources of information from 
which made and the method and circum-
stances of their preparation were 
-31-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
such as to indicate their trustworthi-
ness 
Rule 63 Utah Rules of Evidence (emphasis added) . The proof-
of-loss (Exhibit 28-P), the airlines' claims (Exhibit 37-P), 
and the evaluation thereof (Exhibits 27-P and 36-P) were 
admitted not to prove the truth of the statements made 
therein (i.e. that a loss in a certain dollar amount had 
occurred) , but to prove that INA had demanded and received 
reasonable evidence from the ATC of the losses sustained ~ 
a result of Lanseair's default. For this purpose, the 
exhibits are not hearsay. All other possible objections ~ 
the admission of these exhibits were waived by defendant 
Nielsen's failure to bring such grounds, if any, to the 
attention of the trial court. (Point I (E) (1), supra. l 
Moreover, even if these exhibits do constitute 
hearsay, they were admissible under the business records 
exception. Each of these exhibits was produced by Mrs. 
Darlene Dolan from the files of the ATC, which it was her 
responsibility to maintain and control. (Tr. at 146-47; R. 
at 747-48.) The trustworthiness of the documents is attesto 
to by the fact that they were routinely produced by several 
of the airlines that comprise the ATC. There would simply 
be no reason for a national airline to falsify its records 
so as to enable INA to impose an unjust obligation against 
defendant Nielsen. Implicit in the trial courL's admissi~ 
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of these documents is a finding of trustworthiness sufficient 
to satisfy the requirements of Rule 63(13). 
Finally, even if the admission of all of these 
exhibits was erroneous, the error would be harmless. As 
noted above, with the introduction of the indemnity agree-
ment (Exhibit 1-P) and the canceled check by which INA made 
payment to the ATC (Exhibit 32-P), INA established a prima 
facie case and the burden shifted to defendant Nielsen to 
demonstrate grounds sufficient to constitute a defense, 
which he failed to do. Therefore, even if all of the other 
exhibits received by the trial court were erroneously 
received, there is still sufficient evidence properly 
admitted to support the Judgment entered against defendant 
Nielsen. 
(3) The Alleged Credits. Defendant Nielsen 
also contends that the trial court erred in refusing to 
admit Exhibit 45-D, which consisted of auditor's coupons, 
void flight coupons, and audit detail in connection with 
credit card sales. (Tr. at 247; R. at 818.) Defendant 
Nielsen claimed that these materials constituted a credit to 
be allowed as an offset against his liability to INA. The 
trial court, however, refused to admit the exhibit on the 
basis that neither defendant Nielsen nor anyone else had 
brought the alleged credits to the attention of INA prior 
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to its payment to the ATC on January 22, 1975. (Tr. at25:. 
55; R. at 822-26.) The trial court thus found that defend0 
Nielsen had waived or become estopped to assert any claim'. 
these credits by his dilatory conduct. (R. at 386 and 391. 
Defendant Nielsen attempted to introduce the a~: 
detail allegedly constituting this credit through the 
testimony of Rulon DeYoung. It was Mr. DeYoung's own 
testimony, however, that these "credits" were not present~ 
even to the ATC prior to INA's payment of the Lanseair 
claim: 
MR. DART: If I could voir dire one 
more question, during the time 
that you had these tickets 
that may or may not be credits, 
were they ever presented to the 
Air Traffic Conference to be 
treated by them and be reviewed 
by them to determine if they 
would give you a credit for 
them prior to February, 1975? 
MR. DeYOUNG: To my knowledge, no. 
Transcript at 252 (R. at 823). Thus, when INA paid the 
ATC's claim on January 22, 1975, these alleged credits hac 
never been mentioned; the Record firmly supports the trial 
court's ruling. 
Moreover, when advised of the apparent Lanseair 
default, defendant Nielsen made no effort to bring any 
"credits" to the attention of either the ATC or INA; he 
merely proclaimed that his alleged letter of August 23, l~· 
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shielded him from all liability. Exhibit 3-P, for example, 
was received into evidence without objection. That exhibit 
is a copy both of INA's letter to defendant Nielsen and of 
his response, written across the bottom, that "the enclosed 
copy of letter mailed to Air Traffic Conference should be 
self-explanatory." He made no mention of "credits". 
Likewise, in response to a similar notification 
from Marsh and McLennan, INA's broker in the District of 
Columbia, defendant Nielsen responded on November 4, 1974, 
merely with the assertion that he had relieved himself of 
all liability under the indemnity agreement. Again, he made 
no mention of the credits he now claims. (Exhibit 2-P.) 
Moreover, it is significant to note that in the course of 
making a proffer to the trial court, defendant Nielsen's 
counsel stated: 
I would further offer the fact that, 
Your Honor, when the first demand was made 
upon Lanseair and Mr. Nielsen by anyone in 
this matter and before the bonding company 
paid the claim that they were advised as 
to the existence of these credits. 
Now, I think there may be a letter 
that I can offer in support of that if 
I can have a moment--if I may have a 
moment, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Why don't we take a 
recess at this point and give you a 
moment. 
Transcript at 255-56 (R. at 826-27). When court resumed 
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session some twenty minutes later Mr. Garrett acknowledged: 
I have been unable to locate the 
letter that I thought existed. I thought 
it was in evidence to the bonding company 
concerning the credits. 
Transcript at 256 (R. at 827). No such letter was ever 
offered on behalf of defendant Nielsen. Accordingly, the 
evidence is uncontradicted that INA had no notice of defen-
dant Nielsen's claim to a credit or offset against his 
liability until after it had made payment to the ATC on 
January 22, 1975, based upon the proof-of-loss and extensiw 
documentation submitted by the ATC. 
II. THE ATTORNEYS FEES AWARDED TO INA SHOULD BE 
INCREASED. 
The personal indemnity agreement signed by defend; 
Nielsen provides for the payment of "any and all loss, 
costs, charges, suits, damages, counsel fees, and expenses 
of whatever kind or nature (Exhibit 1-P.) The 
original complaint in this action was filed on June 7, 1971 
Since that time, defendant Nielsen has vigorously sought tt 
avoid the obligations undertaken in his personal indemni~ 
agreement. Following entry of Judgment on March 19, 1979, 
defendant Nielsen filed a Motion "to alter and amend find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law and enter a new judgme: 
(R. at 399-410.) Following the denial of this Motion on 
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July 23, 1979 (R. at 412-13), defendant Nielsen filed his 
Notice of Appeal to this Court (R. at 414 and 426). 
Accordingly, INA has been forced to continue the 
services of its attorneys not only to defend defendant 
Nielsen's post-judgment motions, but also to defend this 
appeal. Since defendant Nielsen has agreed that he will 
reimburse INA for all attorneys fees reasonably incurred, it 
is appropriate that the fees awarded to INA be increased in 
recognition of the additional services rendered since the 
entry of the original Judgment on March 19, 1979. 
The propriety of an additional award on account of 
attorney's fees incurred on appeal was recognized by this 
Court in Swain v. Salt Lake Real Estate and Investment 
Company, 3 Utah 2d 121, 279 P.2d 709 (1955). The trial 
court in that case had refused to award any attorneys fees 
to the prevailing purchasers under a uniform real estate 
contract of which the vendor had sought to declare a for-
feiture. This court reversed, holding: 
[W]e are of the opinion that the stipu-
lated amount of such fee should cover 
services rendered in the court below 
and on appeal. Attorneys' fees on 
appeal are discretionary with this court 
279 P.2d at 711 (emphasis added). Although this Court did 
not, in the cited case, make a specific award of attorneys 
fees on account of the appeal, the principle that such fees 
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may be awarded is clearly stated. 
The precise question whether a surety is entitled 
to an additonal award against its personal indemnitor for 
attorneys fees incurred by the surety on appeal was reached 
by the Oregon Supreme Court in Hartford Accident and 
Indemnity Company v. Maus, 514 P.2d 61 (Ore. 1973). In 
that case, the surety brought an action against the persona: 
indemnitor to recover a loss that it had paid on his behalf. 
The personal indemni tor prevailed at the trial court and the 
surety appealed. On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled in 
favor of the surety; thereafter, a petition was filed by tk 
surety to recover its additional attorneys fees incurred oc 
the appeal. The indemnity agreement, like that present in 
this case, provided that the personal indemnitor would p~ 
"any and all liability for damages, loss, costs, charges, 
and expenses of whatsoever kind or nature (including coumi 
and attorney's fees) 514 P.2d at 61. The Oregon 
Supreme Court held that, in view of this language, an 
additional award based upon the attorneys fees incurred by 
the surety should be entered against the personal indem-
ni tor. The court awarded $1,500 in additional fees. 514 
P.2d at 62. 
In Maus, a surety appealing from an ac1verse 
judgment was held entitled to an award of additional 
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attorneys fees incurred on appeal; ~ fortiori, INA is 
entitled to an award of additional attorneys fees incurred 
in defending this appeal from a judgment in its favor. 
However, in view of this Court's holding in 
Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, 578 P.2d 520 (Utah 1978), plaintiff-
respondent INA hereby abandons the remaining portion of its 
cross-appeal in which it asserted that the trial court's 
award of only $3,000 in attorneys fees should be set aside 
since the uncontradicted evidence was that the reasonable 
amount of such fees was not less than $6,000. 
CONCLUSION 
There is much evidence to support each of the 
Findings made by the trial court, and defendant Nielsen has 
failed to delineate a single Finding that is not supported 
by substantial evidence. Upon the introduction of the 
personal indemnity agreement and the canceled check by which 
INA made payment on account of Lanseair's default, INA 
established a prima facie case against defendant Nielsen, 
which he failed to rebut. 
As his principal line of defense, defendant 
Nielsen contends that his obligations to INA were terminated 
by an incorrectly addressed letter that he alleges he mailed 
to the ATC on August 23, 1974. An employee of the addressee 
testified that there was no indication of the letter having 
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ever been received, and the clear inference to be drawn f~: 
her testimony was that the letter had not been received. 
The trial court's finding that the letter was never receive: 
is well supported by the Record. 
Even if the alleged letter had been received by 
the ATC, it would have been insufficient to terminate 
defendant Nielsen's obligation since the ATC was not an 
agent of INA. Additionally, even if received, the notice 
would not have been given in time to terminate defendant 
Nielsen's obligations prior to Lanseair's default because 
INA was entitled to a resonable time to protect its interes· 
Finally, the letter upon which defendant Nielsen relies is 
not a clear and precise statement that he wishes to be 
relieved of his indemnity obligations; it is not addressed 
to the surety and it requests only that the ATC advise INA 
of the change of ownership. 
Defendant Nielsen's secondary contention that tli 
trial court erred in finding that the bond remained in faro 
at the time of this loss is, likewise, without merit. ~e 
Schedule Bond provided that INA could terminate its obli~· 
tion to the ATC only upon 30-day notice. Lanseair's prY~ 
to INA became delinquent September 1, 1974, and almost 
immediately thereafter INA gave notice to the ATC that the 
inclusion of Lanseair on the Schedule Bond would be ter~~ 
October 10, 1974. Defendant Nielsen agreed that his persc: 
-40-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
indemnity agreement should continue through "any continuation" 
of the bond, therefore, his contention that merely because 
the premium had become delinquent, he was automatically 
relieved of all liability is without merit. 
Also without merit is defendant Nielsen's conplaint 
that the trial court erred in admitting a copy of the 
Schedule Bond over his objection that it was hearsay. Since 
the bond was not offered to prove the truth of any statement 
it contained, but only to prove the terms and provisions of 
the bond, it did not constitute hearsay and was properly 
admitted. Any other possible basis of objection was waived 
by defendant Nielsen's failure to raise it. The same 
reasoning applies to the admission of documentation sub-
mitted to the ATC by the airlines. Moreover, even if viewed 
as hearsay, these exhibits were clearly admissible under the 
business record exception. 
Defendant Nielsen's final complaint is that the 
trial court erred in failing to allow alleged credits as an 
offset. The trial court rejected evidence of these "credits" 
on the basis that defendant Nielsen had waived or become 
~stopped to assert them against INA. In response to noti-
fication from INA of Lanseair's default and its intention to 
look to defendant Nielsen for reimbursement, defendant 
Nielsen replied merely that he had terminated his indemnity; 
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he made no effort to advise INA of the existence of the 
alleged credits. There is ample evidence to support the 
trial court's ruling that, not having been timely raised, 
these credits could not constitute an offset. 
The personal indemnity agreement signed by defenda' 
Nielsen expressly provides that he will reimburse INA for 
all attorneys fees and other expenses incurred. After the 
trial court awarded INA $3,000 as its attorneys fee, INA ha 0 
been compelled to defend defendant Nielsen's post-judgment 
motions and this appeal. Accordingly, INA is entitled toll 
additional award representing the further attorneys fees 
incurred. 
There being ample evidence in the record to 
support the trial court's judgment in favor of INA, that 
judgment must be affirmed; it is appropriate, however, that 
an additional award be made on account of the attorney's 
fees incurred by INA since trial. i\ 11~ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ;.t.L day of March, 
1980. 
By 
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I certify that I mailed two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Respondent's Brief to Edward M. 
Garrett, Esq., 144 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84102, this 'c(~ day of March, 1980. 
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